A New Approach for Analysing Income Convergence across Countries. by O'Neill, Donal & Van Kerm, Philippe
 
 
 
A New Approach for Analysing Income Convergence across Countries.a 
 
 
 
 
Donal O’Neill* and Philippe Van Kerm** 
 
 
 
October 2003 
Preliminary Draft  
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we develop a coherent framework that integrates both traditional 
measures of -convergence and -convergence within a study of cross-country 
income dynamics. To do this we exploit the close links that exist between studies of   
income mobility and studies analysing the progressivity of the tax system. We also 
develop a welfare interpretation for the concept of -convergence, which 
distinguishes it from the more general form of -convergence and which also suggests 
that the -process may be worthy of independent study. We illustrate our approach 
using data for the period 1960-2000. 
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1. Introduction 
 The degree to which income or productivity levels have converged across  
countries over time has been the subject of extensive research. The initial studies 
tended to be descriptive in nature, highlighting the key trends in inequality over time 
(Abramovitz (1986), Baumol (1986)). However in recent years this research has 
become more closely connected with research on the theory of economic growth. Two 
theories have come to dominate the literature on economic growth. The traditional 
Solow growth model (Solow (1956)) predicts that countries that are furthest away 
from their steady states will tend to grow more quickly than countries closer to their 
steady state. For countries with the same steady state, this implies that incomes will 
converge along the transition path to the steady state. In contrast endogenous growth 
models (Romer (1986)) can generate patterns of growth that do not exhibit any 
tendency towards convergence.1 It was suggested that the presence or otherwise of 
convergence across countries could form the basis of a test of the neo-classical growth 
model versus more recent endogenous growth models. As a result, several papers 
have been written examining the nature of the convergence process across countries  
(Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992), Mankiw, Weil and Romer (1992)). However, this 
subsequent literature has in turn generated a lot of controversy, debate and confusion 
regarding how to measure and interpret income convergence in general.  
The dominant approach in the early literature is characterised by the work of 
Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992). This involves regressing income growth rates on 
initial income in order to test whether poor countries grow faster than richer 
countries.2 However, several authors (Friedman (1992) and Quah (1993)) have argued 
that although these regressions may detect mobility within a distribution they tell us 
little about convergence in the sense of a reduction in income dispersion across 
countries. It is possible to observe poor countries growing faster than rich countries 
and yet incomes diverging. For this to happen it must be the case that the initially 
                                                          
1 The key distinction between these two models is the presence or otherwise of diminishing returns to 
capital. For a more detailed discussion of alternative growth models and  their implications for the 
evolution of the international distribution of income see de la Fuente (1997).  
2 Essentially one considers a regression model of the form titi
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of >0 are taken as evidence of convergence. In practice a non-linear version of this equation may be 
estimated but this makes little difference to the final results. It can be easily shown that  measures 
how rapidly an economy’s output approaches its steady state.   
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poorer country overtakes/leapfrogs the richer country so that the rankings of both 
countries are reversed.3,4 To distinguish between these different forms of convergence 
Sala-I-Martin (1996a)5 coined the term -convergence to capture situations where 
“poor economies tend to grow faster than rich ones”. The term -convergence is then 
defined as a situation in which “a group of countries are converging in the sense..that 
the dispersion of their real per capita GDP levels tend to decrease over time.”. While 
Friedman (1992) has argued that the real test of convergence should focus on the 
consistent diminution of variance among countries, Sala-I-Martin (1996a,b) argues 
that both concepts of convergence are interesting and should be analysed empirically.  
In this paper we establish the close links that exist between existing measures 
of -convergence and measures of tax progression used in the public finance 
literature. We exploit this relationship in order to develop a coherent framework for 
studying realised cross-country income dynamics that integrates existing measures of 
convergence. Our approach allows us to identify the relative contributions of -
convergence and leapfrogging to overall -convergence. It also allows for the 
possibility of incorporating varying degrees of inequality aversion into the measure of 
-convergence. We also develop a welfare interpretation for the concept of -
convergence that illustrates why the concept may be worthy of independent study. We 
illustrate our approach by examining income dynamics across countries from 1960-
2000. 
 
2.Decomposing Inequality 
  
2.1 Measuring the Progressivity of Income Tax 
In this sub-section of the paper we briefly outline the fundamental concepts 
and techniques used by economists studying the progressivity of the tax system. In the 
                                                          
3 Furthermore as noted by Friedman (1992) the presence of measurement error may bias the mobility 
estimates obtained from these regressions (see also O’Neill, Sweetman and Van de gaer (2002)) The 
approach we outline in this paper does not address the measurement error bias. However since our 
approach avoids the need for regression analysis it does provide a measure of -convergence which is 
free of the potential biases involved in estimating dynamic data models. For a discussion of these 
biases in the context of Barro-Regressions see Lee, Pesaran and Smith (1997). 
4 Tamura (1992), Brezis et al (1993) and  Sugimoto (2003) present examples of growth models in 
which leapfrogging/overtaking occurs. Tamura (1992) and Sugimoto (2003) emphasise the role of 
inequality within countries in generating differential growth paths, while Brezis et al (1993) focus on 
the disadvantage of leading countries in adopting new technologies.  
5 In that paper Sala-I-Martin dates the first use of this term to his Ph.D thesis in 1990. 
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next sub-section we illustrate how these techniques can be adapted to study cross-
country income dynamics. In particular we develop a coherent framework for 
understanding the nature of income convergence across countries.  
The starting point for much of the work on income redistribution is the 
concept of a Lorenz curve and the associated Gini-coefficient.6 The Lorenz curve 
plays an important role in welfare economics7 and is constructed by first ordering 
individuals by income, starting with the lowest. Once this is done, the cumulative 
proportion of total income received by the income units is plotted against the 
cumulative proportion of the population represented by these individuals. By 
definition the first ordinate on the curve corresponds to zero percent of the population 
which by definition must account for zero percent of total income. At the other 
extreme the final ordinate relates to 100% of the population which, as a group, must 
account for 100% of total income. The ordinates for the points in between these 
extremes are given by (p,Lx(p)) where : 
 
p=F(x) and 

x
F
x ssdFpL
0
)(1)(   
 
F is the mean of the income distribution whose cumulative distribution function is 
denoted by F. In situations where every member of the population receives the same 
income the Lorenz curve corresponds to the 45 degree line. In situations of extreme 
inequality, where one member of the population has all the income, the Lorenz curve 
will run along the horizontal axis before jumping up to the 45-degree line. In 
situations between these two extremes the Lorenz Curve will be a convex curve lying 
beneath the 45-degree line. The difference between the observed Lorenz curve and the 
45-degree line is thus a plausible measure of inequality. This in turn provides the 
intuition behind the Gini coefficient which is equal to twice the area between the 
straight 45 degree line plot and the Lorenz curve Lx. Formally the Gini coefficient can 
be written as: 
                                                          
6 A more detailed discussion of what follows can be found in Lambert (1993). For an application of the 
use of Lorenz curves in studies of regional income convergence in the U.S see Bishop et al (1992, 
1994).  
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A tax-system t(x) is said to be progressive if the average tax rate 
x
xt )(  
is increasing with income (x). For our purposes it will be helpful to use an 
equivalent formulation of progressivity based on the redistributive power of the tax 
system. To do this we introduce the idea of a concentration curve, which we denote as 
CCxz(p). The concentration curve for Z (with respect to X) plots the cumulative shares 
of Z against quantiles in the X-distribution. It is important to note that CCxz(p) will 
differ from Lz(q) in situations where the rankings of individuals based on X and Z 
differ and we will make use of this in our later analysis. Having defined what we 
mean by a concentration curve we can now state the Jakobsson-Fellman theorem 
which establishes the relationship between progressivity and redistribution.  
 
Jakobsson-Fellman Theorem:  
F(x).CCLCC
dx
xxtd
T
x
X
x
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For proof see Lambert page 150. 
 
Intuitively this theorem states that the tax system is progressive if and only if 
the distribution of post-tax income (holding fixed rankings) is distributed more evenly 
than pre-tax income, which in turn is distributed more equally than tax liabilities. We 
will make use of this equivalence in developing our framework. 
In the same way as we derived the Gini-coefficient from the Lorenz curve, we 
can also define an area measure of the extent to which the concentration curve 
deviates from the 45 degree line. This is known as the Concentration coefficient Cxz. 
Formally the Concentration coefficient can be written as : 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7 Atkinson (1970) and Shorrocks (1983) derive a series of results that show that the ability to rank 
distributions in terms of welfare depends on the relative positions of the respective Lorenz curves. 
These results are summarised in Lambert (1983). 
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Within this framework any change in inequality can now be viewed as a two 
step process. The first step measures the amount of redistribution of post-tax income 
from the position attainable after a distributionally neutral equal-yield taxation. It can 
be easily shown that this involves comparing the Lorenz Curve for pre-tax income 
with the concentration curve of post-tax income. Expressed in this way progressivity 
is viewed in terms of the relationship between pre and post tax income distributions, 
keeping fixed an individuals relative ranking. The second component compares the 
concentration curve of post-tax income with the Lorenz curve for post-tax income. As 
noted earlier these curves will differ (with the Lorenz curve exhibiting more 
inequality) in circumstances where the tax schedule results in a reranking of 
individuals over the two distributions.  
Formally we can write this decomposition as : 
 
G=GX-GX-T=(GX-CXX-T) – (GX-T-CXX-T)=DP+R 
 
The first term measures the redistributive impact of progressivity using only the 
rankings from the initial distribution. This term is often referred to as the Reynolds-
Smolensky index of vertical equity. The second term uses the final distribution of 
income and measures the increase in inequality due to reranking. In this way we can 
identify the relative importance of both these processes on the overall change in 
inequality, G.  
 The above decomposition can be generalised to settings that utilise the 
generalised S-Gini coefficient (Gx(v)).8 This coefficient allows for a parameter of 
inequality aversion, v, when calculating the summary measure of dispersion. The 
formal definition is : 
 
   
  
1
0
2 )()1()1(1)( dppLpvvvG x
v
x  
where 1<v<. 
                                                          
8 For a more detailed discussion see Lerman and Yitzhaki (1984) 
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Intuitively the S-Gini allows for different weights to be attached to different 
income ranges when integrating over the Lorenz curve. The regular Gini is obtained 
by setting v=2. When v is set less than 2 relatively more weight is given to incomes at 
the top of the distribution. At the extreme value of v=1, G(v)=0, so that irrespective of 
the distribution inequality will be coded as zero, a form of inequality neutrality. On 
the other hand a value of v>2 attaches relatively greater weight to differences at the 
bottom of the distribution. As v G(v) tends to 1- min
x   so that reductions in 
inequality is disproportionally driven by the agent with the lowest income – an 
extreme form of inequality aversion. Our earlier decomposition carries over to this 
extended measure and can be written as : 
 
G(v)=GX(v)-GX-T(v)=(GX(v)- CXX-T(v)) – (GX-T (v)- CXX-T(v))=DP(v)+R(v) 
 
 
 
2.2: Progressivity, Reranking, -convergence and -convergence. 
 
 In earlier research Benabou and Ok (2001) and Jenkins and Van Kerm (2002) 
adapt these concepts to study mobility within the distribution of individual incomes. 
In our paper we apply these techniques to a study of income convergence across 
countries. We show how the concepts developed above can be exploited so as to 
obtain a better understanding of income dynamics in the growth literature. To do this 
we simply let X from the previous section denote initial income, Y=X-T denote final 
income and T represents a country’s income losses or gains over this period. G 
denotes the change in income dispersion over time and is therefore a direct measure of 
-convergence. The extension to the S-Gini allows us to examine the sensitivity of 
trends in -convergence to different specifications of inequality aversion. The 
Progressivity term, DP(v), captures the extent to which income inequality is reduced 
over time as a result of higher growth rates among lower income countries. Measuring 
the progressivity of the tax system in terms of the redistributive impact of the tax 
system is completely analogous to examining the impact of variations in growth rates 
across countries on income inequality in the convergence setting. In particular, -
convergence, defined as situation where “poor economies tend to grow faster than 
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rich ones” is nothing more than progressive income growth. Thus the first term in our 
decomposition measures the contribution of -convergence towards the overall 
reduction in income dispersion. The second term in the decomposition measures the 
negative impact of positional mobility on income inequality. In the growth context 
this captures the notion of leapfrogging. 
We can use Figures 1, 2 and 3 to illustrate our decomposition. Figure 1 
illustrates a situation where both -convergence and -convergence coexist without 
any leapfrogging/reranking. In our approach the -convergence would be captured by 
a fall in the Gini-coefficient. For this example all of this reduction would be attributed 
to the progressivity of income growth, so that G=DP. The absence of reranking 
would be reflected in a measure of R=0.  
Figure 2, illustrates a situation where there is -convergence but no -
convergence. In this example inequality has not changed over time – so there has been 
no -convergence (G=0). On the other hand there has been substantial -
convergence – the poor country has grown faster than the richer country. However 
this is masked in the overall inequality figure by the complete reranking of the two 
countries. Our approach will identify the redistributive contribution of -convergence 
to inequality in these data but this will be entirely offset by the contribution of the 
leapfrogging component, so that –DP=R>0. Not only will our framework identify the 
tendency of poor countries to grow faster but it simultaneously quantifies the extent to 
which this is offset by reranking in the data.  
Finally, Figure 3 illustrates another process for which there is no -
convergence. However this case differs from that in Figure 2 in that this new process 
is static. Again  G=0 but for this process our decomposition would result in 
DP=R=0. Our decomposition would identify this as a growth process without either 
-convergence or leapfrogging. 
These examples help clarify an important point. Sala-I-Martin (1996b) begins 
his paper by defining -convergence in the traditional way by noting that “there is -
convergence if poor economies tend to grow faster than rich ones”. However later in 
the paper he suggests that -convergence studies the mobility of income within the 
same distribution. As a result, some researchers (Boyle and McCarthy (1997)) have 
drawn parallels between -convergence and measures of rank mobility, defining 
indices of rank concordance as direct measures of -convergence. Clearly for a 
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distribution to exhibit -convergence without -convergence it must be the case that 
countries are changing ranks (Figure 2). However as Figure 1 shows it is possible to 
have -convergence without any positional mobility. It is also possible to have rank 
mobility without -convergence. The definition of -convergence simply requires 
poor countries to grow faster than rich countries, irrespective of whether or not there 
is leapfrogging. Both a Barro-regression approach and our redistributive approach 
would indicate a strong role for -convergence for the process illustrated in the 
example in Figure 1, measures based on rank correlations would not. While the issue 
of positional mobility is interesting, it is captured by our measure R, which in turn 
measures reranking/leapfrogging and not progressivity/-convergence. In this 
example R would contribute nothing to the change in income inequality.  
We believe that these examples illustrate the potential that our framework 
offers to provide a coherent approach that integrates the three important features of 
the growth process: -convergence, -convergence and leapfrogging. The next 
section provides an empirical illustration of this approach. We apply our 
decomposition to data on cross-country income dynamics taken from the latest release 
of the Penn-World tables. We briefly discuss the data before applying our approach to 
data on a full sample of 98 countries and also a restricted sample of 25 OECD 
countries. We conclude with a discussion of the welfare implications of our analysis. 
 
3: Data and Results 
 
3.1 Data 
In this section of the paper we analyse income convergence between 1960 and 
2000, taken from the latest version of the Penn-World Tables.9 The Penn World Table 
provides purchasing power parity and national income accounts converted to 
international prices for 168 countries for some or all of the years 1950-2000. In this 
paper we use data for a sample of 98 countries that provided complete data over the 
period 1960-2000. We also look at income dynamics for a restricted set of 25 OECD  
countries. Income is measured as real per-capita gross domestic product in 1996 
international prices. These data have been used extensively in previous studies of 
                                                          
9 Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for 
International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002. 
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convergence and are described in more detail in Summers and Heston (1991). The 
countries used in the analysis are presented in Tables 1 and 2.  
Figures 4 and 5, provide a useful graphical summary of the evolution of 
income inequality over the period 1962-1998. Figure 4 summarises the data for the 
OECD sample, while Figure 5, provides the results for the full sample. We focus first 
on the results for the OECD countries.  
For the purposes of constructing this graph we use a 5-year moving average of 
incomes. The income for 1962 is thus an average of that country’s income from 1960-
1964. Likewise 1998 income measure is an average of incomes from 1996-2000. 
Incomes are expressed relative to the overall mean for that year, so that values above 
1 correspond to high-income countries and values below 1 represent low-income 
countries.  
The North East  (NE) and South West (SW) quadrants of Figure 4 are simple 
transformations of the empirical distribution functions of incomes in the two periods. 
This establishes a relationship between income and rank in the two years. The 
estimated line in the North West (NW) quadrants maps the relationship between 
incomes in these two marginal distributions. We can interpret the numbers on the 
horizontal axis as showing the income a country would have received in 1998 if they 
had maintained their 1962 ranking. The 45-degree line corresponds to a situation of 
constant relative incomes. The results in this quadrant show that in the absence of 
leapfrogging countries with below average income would have expected their income 
to rise faster than those with above average income over this period. These graphs 
therefore provide a simple graphical framework for describing the precise nature of 
the sigma convergence that occurred for the OECD countries over this time period.  
The South East (SE) quadrant introduces the concept of leapfrogging to the 
analysis Deviations from the 45-degree line in this quadrant show the extent of re-
ranking, with countries above the 45 degree having increased their rank over time and 
vice versa. The results show that almost every country changed rank over this period, 
with countries such as Ireland, Japan and Norway moving up the distribution, while 
countries such as Sweden, New Zealand and Britain moving down. To examine the 
consequences of this leapfrogging on inequality we return to the NW quadrant. The 
easiest way to visualise the impact of leapfrogging on relative incomes is to look at 
the nature and composition of income clusters in both distributions. Looking at the 
NW quadrant for 1962 (along the horizontal axis) we can identify approximately 3 
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clusters of countries: a low-income cluster, consisting of Korea, Turkey, Mexico, 
Greece, Portugal, Spain, Japan and Ireland, a high-income cluster involving 
Luxembourg, USA and Switzerland and a cluster of middle-income countries made 
up of the remaining OECD members. Switching axis to look at 1998, there still 
appears to be a low income, middle-income and high-income cluster. However our 
framework allows us to look at compositional changes within and between these 
groups. We notice that Switzerland has fallen out of the high-income group into the 
middle-group. New Zealand, which was initially at the upper end of the middle-
income group, is now at the lower end of this group. The big movers out of the low-
income group were Ireland and Japan who have now joined the middle-income 
countries.  
Figure 5 provides the same information for the full sample of 98 countries 
used in the extended analysis. Although identifying individual countries becomes 
more difficult it is again apparent that although leapfrogging was widespread over this 
timeframe much of the re-ranking resulted in countries changing positions within 
groups, with relatively few countries changing groups. The growth in relative incomes 
for this full-sample tends to be concentrated in the middle of the distribution, with 
relative incomes at the very top of the distribution falling. In the next section we use 
the decomposition presented earlier to look at these changes more formally. 
 
3.2 -convergence, -convergence and leapfrogging 1960-2000. 
The results of our analysis are presented in Tables 3-6. Tables 3 and 5, refer to 
the OECD sample while Tables 4 and 6 refer to the full sample. We begin with 
sample Table 3 which reports the Generalised Gini coefficient for the  set of OECD 
countries at 20-year intervals over the  period 1960-2000. We report the Gini for three 
values of the inequality aversion parameter equal to 1.5, 2, 2.5, respectively. The first 
places relatively more weight on incomes at the top of the distribution, the second 
corresponds to the regular Gini-coefficient, while the third gives relatively more 
weight to inequality at the low end of the distribution.  
The overall trend is similar for all three coefficients and indicates a substantial 
reduction of income dispersion over the period 1960-2000. For all three parameters 
the majority of this reduction took place between 1960 and 1980, with a significant 
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slowdown in convergence after this period.10 However precisely how we interpret the 
trend in the last 20 years depends on the relative weight given to inequality at the top 
end of the distribution. When we weight heavily income differences at the top end of 
the distribution we find that inequality has increased substantially in the last 10 years. 
In fact according to this measure inequality in 2000 is higher than it was in 1980.11 In 
contrast the measure which places more weight on inequality at the low end of the 
distribution, while showing a slowdown in convergence, continues to display a trend 
towards a more equal distribution of income. These contrasting results suggest that 
the slowdown in income convergence over this period is driven by a small number of 
the richest countries pulling away from the rest of the distribution, so that the share of 
the wealthiest countries has increased substantially.  In contrast table 4 reiterates the 
well-known result that for the world as a whole over this period incomes diverged 
substantially, though as Figure 5 suggests much of this is driven by income increases 
for middle-income countries.. 
The results in Table 5 and 6 decompose these changes in income inequality 
using the framework outlined in section 2. This approach allows us to determine the 
redestributive impact of income growth for both samples. The results are provided for 
the traditional Gini coefficient. The rows of the tables refer to different time periods 
while the columns refer to various components of the convergence process. The first 
column shows the change in the Gini-Coefficient over the relevant time period and 
measures -convergence as discussed above. Columns 2 and 3, present the relative 
contribution of progressive income growth (-convergence) and reranking 
(leapfrogging) towards these trends.  
Focusing on the OECD sample the main feature that emerges over this period 
is that of the two prevailing forces the tendency towards -convergence is the 
dominant force driving cross-country income dynamics.12 For example in the early 
                                                          
10 This slowdown in convergence among developed countries was discussed in O’Neill (1996). The 
analysis in that paper suggests that the slowdown may be related to changes in the rate of human 
capital accumulation. 
11  This is not evident in Figure 4 which plots the evolution of income inequality over the entire 40 
years. However if we repeat the analysis for the same sub-periods as reported in Table 1, the same 
trend of rising relative income at the very top of the distribution between 1978-88 and 1988-1998 
becomes apparent. In the interests of brevity we have omitted the graphical summary for each of the 
sub-periods, though these are available from the authors upon request. 
12 Using measures of rank correlations Boyle and McCarthy (1997) also concluded that “positional 
mobility” was relatively unimportant over this time. However, our approach differs in two ways. Firstly 
we can determine precisely the contribution of this component to income dynamics and secondly we do 
not equate positional mobility with -convergence. 
 12
period during which much of the decline in income inequality is observed 
leapfrogging contributed almost nothing to income dynamics. Furthermore, it is 
evident that the stable income distribution observed throughout the last 10 years 
reflects a static distribution with neither leapfrogging nor -convergence contributing 
anything towards a change in income inequality. The last column presents our 
estimates of the traditional measure of -convergence from growth regressions. The 
results are reported in such a way that a positive  indicates convergence. By and 
large the results using the traditional approach is consistent with our analysis. The 
early periods are characterised by significant -convergence, which is absent in the 
later years. However, it is worthwhile making two observations at this stage. Firstly, 
we notice that in every period under consideration we observe both leapfrogging and 
values of <1. Thus we need to be careful interpreting claims that values of <1 rule 
out leapfrogging. This  claim applies only to  “deterministic”  leapfrogging where 
poor economies are systematically predicted to get ahead of rich economies at future 
dates. A value of <1 says nothing about positional mobility in general. An 
alternative way of seeing this is to note that it is possible for observed inequality to 
rise even if the estimated -coefficient from a Barro-regression is less than 1. We will 
return to this issue when we discuss the welfare implications of our analysis.  
Secondly, it is interesting to compare the full period from 1960-2000, with that 
from 1980-1990. For both these periods the estimated  coefficient from the growth 
equations are almost identical. However when you look at our decomposition in 
columns 2 and 3, we see that over for the two periods in question the dynamics 
underlying the income distribution differed substantially. For the overall period 
progressive income growth had a significant redistributive effect as a result of which 
income inequality declined substantially. In the later period however total income 
inequality did not change. Furthermore our decomposition shows that neither of the 
forces underlying convergence was particularly important over this period, so that 
effective -convergence fell substantially over this period. Relying on the Barro-
regression to identify -convergence would miss these differences.  
Table 5, shows the results for the world as a whole. In contrast to the OECD 
sample we find little evidence of  -convergence. For almost every period considered 
both the regressive nature of income growth and any leapfrogging which occurred 
resulted in greater income inequality. Again the results are for the most part consistent 
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with the traditional Barro-regression, although the periods 1970-80 and 1980-1990 
show different trends in effective -convergence, while the estimated coefficient from 
a Barro-regression is equal in these two periods. 
 
3.3 Conditional -Convergence 
 Following Mankiw, Weil and Romer (1992) and Barro and Sala-I-Martin 
(1995) we can adapt our framework to deal with the distinction between absolute -
convergence and conditional -convergence. The analysis presented in the above 
section focused on whether or not  poor countries growing faster than richer countries. 
This concept has been labelled as absolute -convergence in the literature. In keeping 
with earlier research our approach finds evidence of absolute -convergence among 
the OECD but not among the full sample. It is important to realise that models such as 
the Solow growth model do not actually predict that poor countries grow faster than 
rich countries. Instead it predicts that countries that are furthest away from their 
steady states will grow faster than countries closer to the steady state. In the event that 
all countries share the same steady state this will manifest itself in poorer countries 
growing more quickly. However if we allow for countries to have different steady 
states these is no longer the case and we must modify our approach to consider 
conditional -convergence. Conditional convergence examines the relationship 
between growth and initial income having controlled for differences in steady state 
incomes.  
The traditional test for conditional -convergence involves regressing growth 
on initial income holding constant a number of additional variables that determine 
steady state income. If the partial correlation between growth and income is negative 
then we say that the set of countries exhibit conditional -convergence. Such a 
distinction may not be important among groups of countries that are relatively 
homogenous, such as those members of the OECD. However a number of researchers 
have sown that this distinction can be important when looking at a more 
heterogeneous set of countries. With this in mind we modify our approach so as to 
examine the relative importance of conditional -convergence among the full set of 
countries considered in our study. To partial out differences in steady states across 
countries we run the following regression for each year in the sample: 
 
 14
Ln(RGDPi)=+1 ln(SKi)+ 2ln(ni)+i 
 
where RGDPi is real GDP per capita for country i, SKi is the average share of 
real investment in real GDP for country i, and ni is the average rate of growth of the 
working age population for country i.13 The savings rate and population growth rate 
are key determinants of steady state income in exogenous growth models and using 
the residuals from the above regression as a measure of income should eliminate 
much of the heterogeneity arising from differences in steady state incomes.14 Having 
obtained the residuals for each country and each year we rescale the annual residuals 
so as to have the same mean as the raw GDP series for that year.15 These rescaled 
residuals are then used to examine income convergence using the framework outlined 
in section 2. The results are presented in Table 7. The contribution of the re-ranking 
component (column 4) does not differ much depending on whether we examine 
absolute or conditional convergence However, in keeping with earlier work when we 
condition on differences in steady states we now find evidence of conditional -
convergence using both the traditional Barro measure and also our measure which 
focuses directly on the redistributive impact of progressive income growth. 
Furthermore, although there is some evidence leapfrogging has caused inequality to 
rise, especially when we take a 40-year horizon, this component is again dominated 
by the inequality reducing effect of -convergence.  
 
3.4 -convergence, Welfare and Average Rate Progressivity 
In this section we discuss the potential welfare implications of our analysis. In 
doing so we will also look a little more closely at the relationship between our 
measure of -convergence and that obtained from a Barro-Regression.  In the absence 
of reranking any income growth (whether redistributive or not) is welfare improving 
                                                          
13 The averages are taken over the full sample period 1960-2000. 
14 Mankiw, Weil and Romer (1992) also use the average savings and population growth rates to partial 
out differences in steady states in their analysis of conditional convergence.  
15 It is necessary to rescale the residuals before applying our framework since the raw residuals have a 
mean zero. As a result the Gini coefficient is not defined for this series. Formally the Gini coefficient 
can be written as 2
||
N
yy
G i j
ji 
 . Rescaling the residuals as we have ensures that the differences 
estimated Gini for the raw and residualised GDP series only reflects differences in the average absolute 
deviations of both series.  This seems a reasonable way to proceed though we should note that different 
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(relative to the initial distribution) according to any individualistic, symmetric, 
additively separable and inequality averse social welfare function (by definition 
GLC(x+t(x)) > GLC(x) (see Lambert (1993) page 152 for a discussion in the context 
of taxes)).16 However we can show further that having -convergence (progressive 
income growth) is welfare improving, not only in relation to the initial income 
distribution, but also relative to an equal-yield proportional income growth 
counterfactual. The following theorem establishes this result. 
 
Theorem: For every individualistic, symmetric, additive separable and 
inequality averse social welfare function, progressive income growth (-convergence) 
over the full range of incomes, without leapfrogging, increases social welfare more 
than an equal yield proportional growth rate applied to the same pre-growth income 
distribution. 
Proof: 
If the growth rate is proportional then the Lorenz curve for final income (y) 
coincides with the Lorenz curve for initial income (x): Lprop(p)=Lx(p) for all p [0,1] 
By definition average final income is given by y=x(1+t), where t is the 
overall average growth rate. Hence the Generalised Lorenz Curve for final income 
after progressive growth at rate t can be defined as : GLCy(p)=x(1+t)Ly(p). 
From the Jakobbson-Fellman theorem (See Lambert page 150) and our 
assumption of no reranking we can conclude that :  
GLCy(p)=x(1+t)Ly(p) x(1+t)Lx(p)= x(1+t)Lprop(p) all p [0,1].  
The last equality follows from step 1 of the proof. 
By definition this implies that : GLCy(p) GLCprop(p) all p [0,1]. 
Referring to Shorrocks’ theorem (Lambert page 59) completes the result. 
 
It is worth emphasising that the concept of -convergence is the key 
convergence force underlying this theorem. A reduction in -convergence is not 
sufficient to generate this result. It is possible for inequality as measured by say the 
Gini coefficient or the coefficient of variation to fall and for there to be no reranking 
                                                                                                                                                                      
rescaling constants will led to different values for the residualised Gini and also to different values for 
the estimated components of inequality.   
16 GLC(x) denotes the generalised Lorenz curve and is derived by multiplying the original Lorenz 
Curve by mean income. 
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and yet for the Generalised Lorenz curves to cross so that unambiguous welfare 
comparisons may not be possible. This reflects the fact that the Gini-coefficient can 
fall even when income growth is not progressive over the entire range of incomes. 
 Although our earlier results clearly highlight the redistributive effect of 
observed growth patterns for the OECD countries being studied, the analysis up to 
now has used an overall index of effective progressivity. In order to apply the above 
theorem we need to be able to measure income progression along the entire income 
scale. That is we need to switch from an index of effective progression to a measure 
of local progression. The progressivity index we have discussed so far is based on the 
difference between the initial Lorenz curve and the concentration curve for final 
income. As such it measures the redistributive effect of the income growth and is 
associated with Residual Progression measure of local progression (Lambert page 
161). In a study of income convergence this seems an obvious approach to take.  
An alternative way of measuring local progression which is easy to implement 
and which turns out to be important in linking the growth and tax literature is to focus 
directly on the behaviour of the average growth rate : 
X
Xt
X
XY )( , where t(X) is the 
change in income over the two periods and X is initial income. An equivalent way to 
measure progression is to examine whether 0
))((

dx
x
xtd
. This forms the basis for 
Average Rate Progression.17 It is clear that a declining growth schedule, deviations 
from proportional growth and the redistributive effect of observed growth patterns are 
very closely connected. Proportional income growth implies a flat growth schedule 
and no change in inequality. With progressive growth on the other hand a 
disproportionate share of the benefits is received by low-income countries, the growth 
schedule is downward sloping and the redistributive effect of the change is positive. 
To check whether or not 0
))((

dx
x
xtd
 for all values of X we first sorted the data 
by income level and then plotted 
X
Xt )( against X for the period 1960-2000. The results 
are given in Figure 6. From this we can see that there are a number of observations 
                                                          
17 In the same way as the tax yield from equiproportionate increases in initial income is larger the more  
progressive is the tax schedule (Lambert 1993 page 206) we can also show that the total income yield 
from am equiproportionate increase in initial income is larger the greater the degree of Average Rate 
Progression observed in the growth process. 
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that violate our progressivity condition (that is countries for which the growth rate in 
income was larger than the next lowest ranked country). These countries are 
represented by a hollow circle. This makes the application of theorem 1 difficult when 
applied to realised outcomes.  
However, those familiar with the recent literature on growth will quickly 
recognise this way of presenting the results. It is nothing more than a plot of the data 
underlying the standard Barro-regression approach to measuring -convergence.18 
The solid line on the graph denotes the OLS fit from a Barro-regression. In order to 
look at the contribution of -convergence and leapfrogging to observed changes in 
income inequality we have defined progressivity in terms of realised outcomes. It 
would also be possible to use the framework developed above to examine the 
progressivity of the underlying growth process. This would simply involve comparing 
the distribution of initial incomes with the distribution of conditional expected 
incomes rather than actual incomes.19 The same decompositions and theorems as 
outlined earlier would apply. The only difference being that the results would now be 
interpreted in terms of the opportunities afforded by the process rather than in terms 
of realised outcomes. Since we can view the estimated Barro-regression as providing 
the best fit of (X,
X
Xt )( ) we can implement this approach using the average growth 
schedule as predicted by a Barro-regression. For the OECD countries that we have 
analysed the expected average tax schedule is downward sloping. This implies a 
globally progressive growth process which welfare dominates a equal yield 
proportional growth process. In this context the violations of “local” progression that 
we outlined in the outcomes-based approach may be interpreted as simply reflecting 
stochastic deviations from the systematic component of the growth process.20 When 
viewed in this light the Barro-regression measure of convergence and the 
redistributive measure that we adopt in this paper differ only in the principles used to 
                                                          
18 To see this formally we note that an equivalent unit free measure of average rate progression can be 
derived as  
)ln(
ln
)ln(
)
)(
(
.
)
)(
(
*
xd
X
Yd
xd
x
xtd
x
dx
x
xtd
ARP



 . This latter term corresponds to the -parameter 
from a standard Barro-regression.  
19 This is the approach adopted by Benabou and Ok (2001) in their study of individual income 
dynamics behaviour.  
20 Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) extend the decomposition that we use in this study to formally 
allow for randomness in the tax/growth schedule. This enables them to identify the effect of horizontal 
 18
measure progressivity. The first focuses on the rate at which the average growth rate 
changes with initial income (Average Rate Progression), while the latter focuses on 
the elasticity of terminal income to initial income (Residual Progression).  
Irrespective of whether one is interested in interpreting realised growth 
patterns and the subsequent changes in inequality or in analysing the underlying 
growth process, our analysis lends support to the view that both -convergence and -
convergence are important features of the growth process that should be studied 
together. Our paper provides an integrated framework for this analysis. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The results presented in this paper are consistent with earlier studies that  
found that the growth process among OECD countries in the last 40 years has resulted 
in a reduction in income inequality over this time period. While these results are in 
line with those presented in earlier research we believe that the approach adopted in 
this paper represents a significant development in the analysis of cross-country 
income dynamics. The techniques we use allow us to “marry” the approaches 
advocated by Friedman and Quah to study income dynamics, on the one hand, and 
those suggested by Barro and Sala-I-Martin on the other hand. In doing so we develop 
a coherent integrated framework involving concepts which up to now have often been 
viewed as competitors in the analysis of income dynamics. We do this by adapting 
earlier work analysing progressivity in the tax system and applying it to cross-country 
income dynamics. This allows us to separately examine the contribution of non-
proportional income growth and reranking to changes in income inequality.  
We also develop a welfare interpretation for the concept of -convergence. 
We show that the typical Barro-Regression approach to identifying -convergence, is 
equivalent to Average Rate Progression measures in the taxation literature, whereas 
our redistributive approach is based on Residual Progression measures. In developing 
the link between the tax and growth literature we feel we have provided an integrated 
framework for studying income dynamics, through which the connections between 
the various sources of convergence can be better understood and evaluated. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
inequity (unequal treatment of equals) on redistribution. Unfortunately the relatively small sample sizes 
available across countries prohibits the use of their decomposition in our setting. 
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Table 1: Full Sample of 98 countries included in the analysis 
 
Argentina Costa Rica India Malawi Sweden 
Australia Denmark Ireland Malaysia Switzerland 
Austria Dominican 
Republic 
Iran Niger Seychelles 
Burundi Algeria Iceland Nigeria Syria 
Belgium Ecuador Israel Nicaragua Chad 
Benin Egypt Italy Netherlands Togo 
Burkina Faso Ethiopia Jamaica Norway Thailand 
Bangladesh Finland Jordan Nepal Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Bolivia France Japan New Zealand Turkey 
Brazil Gabon Kenya Pakistan Tanzania 
Barbados Ghana Korea Panama United 
Kingdom 
Canada Guinea Sri Lanka Peru Uganda 
Chile Gambia Lesotho Philippines Uruguay 
China Guinea-Bissau Luxembourg Portugal United States 
of America 
Cote d’Ivoire Equatorial 
Guinea 
Morocco Paraguay Venezuela 
Cameroon Greece Madagascar Romania South Africa 
Congo, 
Republic of 
Guatemala Mexico Rwanda Zambia 
Colombia Hong Kong Mali Senegal Zimbabwe 
Comoros Honduras Mozambique Spain  
Cape Verde Indonesia Mauritius El Salvador  
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Table 2: OECD Countries included in the analysis* 
 
Australia Finland Italy Netherlands Sweden 
Austria France Japan Norway Switzerland 
Belgium Greece Korea New Zealand Turkey 
Canada Ireland Luxembourg Portugal United 
Kingdom 
Denmark Iceland Mexico Spain United States 
* Of the 30 countries currently listed as members of the OECD, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, 
Hungary and Germany did not have consistent data for the period 1960-2000. 
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Table 3: Relative Trends in Income Inequality for the OECD countries with 
alternative degrees of Inequality Aversion 
 
Time Period G(1.5) G(2) G(2.5) 
1960 .163 .253 .318 
1970 .132 .205 .260 
1980 .108 .174 .226 
1990 .105 .169 .218 
2000 .114 .171 .214 
 
 
 
Table 4: Relative Trends in Income Inequality for the Full-Sample (N=98) 
with alternative degrees of Inequality Aversion 
 
Time Period G(1.5) G(2) G(2.5) 
1960 .327 .483 .572 
1970 .337 .503 .600 
1980 .336 .510 .612 
1990 .358 .538 .641 
2000 .370 .553 .659 
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Table 5: Income Convergence Dynamics for 25 OECD Countries: 1960-2000 
Time 
period 
-Convergence 
G(2) 
-convergence 
DP(2) 
Reranking 
R(2) 
  
Barro-Regression 
(s-errors in 
brackets) 
1960-
2000 
.171-.253 =  
-.083 
-.116 .033 .012** 
(.0025) 
1960-
1970 
.205-.253 =  
-.048 
-.056 .008 .016** 
(.005) 
1970-
1980 
.174-.205 =  
-.031 
-.045 .014 .013** 
(.004) 
1980-
1990 
.169-.174 =  
-.005 
-.013 .008 .012** 
(.006) 
1990-
2000 
.171-.169=  
 .002 
-.009 .011 .005 
(.006) 
     
 
Table 6: Income Convergence Dynamics for the full-sample of 98 countries: 1960-2000 
Time 
period 
-Convergence 
G(2) 
-convergence 
DP(2) 
Reranking 
R(2) 
  
Barro-Regression 
(s-errors in 
brackets) 
1960-
2000 
.553-.483 =  
.07 
.017 .053 -.004** 
(.0015) 
1960-
1970 
.503-.483 =  
.02 
.012 .008 -.006** 
(.002) 
1970-
1980 
.510-.503 =  
.007 
-.003 .01 -.003 
(.002) 
1980-
1990 
.538-.510 =  
.028 
.02 .008 -.003 
(.002) 
1990-
2000 
.553-.538=  
 .015 
.01 .005 -.007** 
(.002) 
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Table 7: Conditional Income Convergence Dynamics for the full-sample of 98 countries: 
1960-2000 
Time 
period 
-Convergence 
G(2) 
-convergence 
DP(2) 
Reranking 
R(2) 
  
Barro-Regression 
(s-errors in 
brackets) 
1960-
2000 
.345-.386 =  
-.041 
-.113 .072 .005** 
(.0016) 
1960-
1970 
.362-.386 =  
-.024 
-.039 .014 .002 
(.003) 
1970-
1980 
.339-.362 =  
-.023 
-.037 .015 .005** 
(.0028) 
1980-
1990 
.345-.339 =  
.005 
-.01 .015 .008** 
(.002) 
1990-
2000 
.345-.345=  
 0 
-.011 .011 -.0027 
(.003) 
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Figure 1: 
-convergence, -convergence, no leapfrogging 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: 
-convergence, No -convergence, Leapfrogging 
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Figure 3 
No -convergence, No -convergence, No Leapfrogging  
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Figure 4:Graphical Summary of the Evolution of Income Inequality among 
OECD countries 1962-1998. 
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Figure 6: Income Growth Across the OECD Countries 1960-2000 
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